Fix reorg penalty scaling direction and rebuild DAG sizing around a miner-signalled band

Two consensus-parameter bugs, both latent today and both guaranteed to become
live splits later. Neither is a regression; both are cheap to fix now and
expensive to fix after launch.

== 1. The reorg penalty scaled with block time the wrong way ==

FetchScheduler_ComputeReorgPenaltyBlocks had TARGET_BLOCK_TIME in the numerator
and REORG_PENALTY_REF_BLOCK_TIME in the denominator. The penalty is counted in
BLOCKS, so the wall-clock protection it actually buys was

    penalty(d) * TARGET_BLOCK_TIME  ~  d^2 * T^2 / REF

i.e. quadratic in block time, when the stated intent in constants.h is
wall-clock equivalence to the reference scheme defined at REF_BLOCK_TIME = 150.
At T = 90 the chain got 54*d^2 seconds of protection instead of 150*d^2 --
2.78x weaker than intended -- and any future block-time reduction would have
weakened it further, silently.

Swapping the two makes T cancel out of the wall-clock figure:

    penalty(d) = ceil(d^2 * REF / T)   ->   protection ~ d^2 * REF seconds

Penalty in blocks, depth -> before/after: 4 -> 10/27, 8 -> 39/107,
10 -> 60/167, 50 -> 1500/4167, 100 -> 6000/16667.

Verified by rebuilding at TARGET_BLOCK_TIME = 60: wall-clock protection is now
identical at both block times (2400s, 9600s, 15000s, ...), ratio 1.0000. Under
the old formula 60s blocks would have been 56% weaker.

Still integer-only: the ceiling division and saturation guards are unchanged,
and numeratorScale only moves 90 -> 150 while `raised` stays bounded by
REORG_PENALTY_MAX_DEPTH^2 = 1e6, nowhere near overflow.

This is fork choice, not block validity, so mixed-version nodes converge once
the longer penalty expires and no block ever becomes invalid.

== 2. DAG sizing was a fail-open consensus split waiting on block 350000 ==

Fixed, in rough order of severity:

  * FAIL-OPEN PoW. Block_CalculateAutolykos2Hash memset the hash to zero on any
    failure, and zero compares below every target -- so a DAG that was missing,
    mis-sized or had failed to build made *every* block pass PoW validation
    instead of rejecting it. PoW checks now fail closed.

  * TWO DIVERGENT IMPLEMENTATIONS of the same rule: CalculateTargetDAGSize in
    constants.h (mining) and ComputeEpochDagBytesForHeightFromChain in main.c
    (verification). They already disagreed at exactly height == EPOCH_LENGTH,
    where the constants.h copy underflowed size_t computing
    `Chain_Size - 1 - EPOCH_LENGTH` and returned 0.

  * A MEANINGLESS DIFFICULTY COUPLING. difficultyTarget is compact-encoded
    [1B exponent][3B coefficient]; subtracting two compact values mixes
    exponent and mantissa. The first real retarget yields a delta of 900649,
    which times DAG_BASE_GROWTH is ~967 TB, so the result was always clamped
    and the "proportional" term degenerated to a binary base+maxUp/base-maxDown
    switch. The size also never accumulated -- it was always recomputed from
    the constant base -- so the documented 1 GB/epoch growth could not happen.

  * A NON-EPOCH-ALIGNED SEED. GetNextDAGSeed returned hash(tip) while the
    verifier correctly used hash(block[epochIndex * EPOCH_LENGTH - 1]). The
    `chainSize % EPOCH_LENGTH == 0` rebuild guard masked this while running,
    but startup called it at an arbitrary height -- so a node restarted
    mid-epoch built a DAG from a different seed than one that had run straight
    through the boundary, and its blocks were rejected.

  * UNSIGNED PROMOTION. `DAG_BASE_GROWTH * difficultyDelta` promoted the signed
    delta to unsigned long long and wrapped before being assigned back to
    int64_t; the main.c copy cast first, so the two also differed in overflow
    behaviour. Both are gone.

  * A LEAK on the `targetSize <= 0` path in main.c (both block copies).

  * A USE-AFTER-FREE at every epoch boundary: Block_RebuildAutolykos2Dag ran
    DagClear -> DagAllocate -> DagGenerate from whichever thread advanced the
    tip, freeing ctx->dag.buf while miners read it.

  * GetAutolykos2Ctx called DagAllocate without DagGenerate, leaving
    dag.len == 0 so every heavy hash failed -- which, combined with the
    fail-open above, meant "everything is valid". It also memset 1 GiB that
    DagGenerate immediately overwrote.

  * TOCTOU / lock reentrancy: CalculateTargetDAGSize called Chain_Size 4x and
    Chain_GetBlockCopy 2x, each taking chainLock for reading, making it unsafe
    to call from a write-locked section.

--- New sizing rule: default-grow inside a hard band ---

DAG size now follows a recurrence gated by a miner signal in the block header,
clamped to [DAG_MIN_SIZE, DAG_MAX_SIZE]:

    brake  = (hold + down) * DAG_BRAKE_DEN > EPOCH_LENGTH * DAG_BRAKE_NUM
    downQ  =          down * DAG_DOWN_DEN  > EPOCH_LENGTH * DAG_DOWN_NUM

    downQ(k) && downQ(k-1) -> size -= DAG_EPOCH_STEP   (floored at DAG_MIN_SIZE)
    brake                  -> size unchanged
    otherwise              -> size += DAG_EPOCH_STEP   (capped at DAG_MAX_SIZE)

Growth is the default and there is deliberately NO up-vote: every signal a
miner can express only slows the walk or reverses it. Under stratum-style
pooled mining the pool builds the header and therefore controls its share of
the vote, so the mechanism has to be safe under pool capture -- and it is,
because the lever a pool would want (grow the DAG to price out smaller miners)
does not exist. This is NOT because upward capture would be self-defeating: it
would in fact be profitable, since the fixed block reward redistributes to
whoever survives and difficulty retargets down. The protection is the absence
of the lever. The whole upward trajectory is therefore governance
(DAG_EPOCH_STEP, DAG_MAX_SIZE), not signalling.

Braking keeps the DAG small, which helps old hardware and only costs ASIC
resistance -- bounded by DAG_MIN_SIZE, which is the constant that actually
secures the property. Shrinking needs a supermajority sustained across two
consecutive epochs; that gates the onset only, so miners genuinely being
squeezed get relief every epoch rather than every other one.

Thresholds are cross-multiplied rather than divided, so there is no rounding
for nodes to disagree on, and the denominator is the constant epoch length
rather than blocks-observed, so a partial epoch cannot read as a stronger
signal than it is. No floating point anywhere on this path.

--- Header vote field ---

reserved[0] carries the vote: 0 = grow (default), 1 = hold, 2 = down.
reserved[1..2] must be zero. All three already sat inside the packed, hashed
header, so the vote is committed to by both the canonical hash and the PoW hash
and cannot be altered after mining -- no wire-format or hash-layout change.

0 must mean grow, because the point of this shape is that inaction produces
growth; it also means a miner that knows nothing about the vote contributes to
the intended default rather than silently freezing the schedule.

Rejecting unrecognised vote values and non-zero spare bytes is a new validity
rule. It closes 24 bits of undefined-meaning malleable header space.

--- Validation moves to the light path ---

Autolykos2_DagGenerate fills lane i with exactly what ReadDagLaneFromSeed
recomputes for lane i -- Blake2b(seed || (i/2)_LE64), half i&1 -- so the DAG is
a pure cache and the two hashing paths are bit-for-bit equivalent. Validation
therefore uses the light path: no allocation, correct for any epoch rather than
only whichever one the global DAG happens to hold, and the DAG band becomes a
miner requirement rather than a full-node memory requirement.

Chain_OnTipAdvanced no longer rebuilds the DAG at all. MineBlock builds it on
demand for the height it is working on, so a node that does not mine never
allocates one, generation stays off the tip-advance path, and the buffer is
only ever touched by the miner (the ctx mutex remains as a backstop).

--- API changes ---

  + Chain_DagParamsForHeight(chain, height, &dagBytes, seed) -- single source
    of truth for both the size and the epoch seed, backed by a memoised
    per-epoch table on blockchain_t. The table is a pure cache of a function of
    the headers, extended lazily and dropped whenever anything at or below the
    tip changes; it lives on the chain rather than in a global because a
    second, header-only chain is built to re-verify historical PoW. Guarded by
    a per-chain mutex, always taken after chainLock.
  + Block_EnsureAutolykos2Dag / Block_PowHashHeavy / Block_PowHashLight.
    The heavy variant verifies the epoch and size itself, so it can never
    answer from a DAG built for another epoch.
  + Block_HasValidProofOfWorkWithParams -- resolve-once form. MineBlock called
    Block_HasValidProofOfWork inside its nonce loop, so resolving from the
    chain per attempt would have taken chainLock millions of times per block.
  + Block_HasValidVote.
  ~ Block_HasValidProofOfWork / Block_IsFullyValid now take the chain, because
    PoW validity genuinely is chain-relative. blockchain_t gained a struct tag
    so block.h can forward-declare it.
  - CalculateTargetDAGSize, GetNextDAGSeed, ComputeEpochDagBytesForHeightFromChain,
    ComputeEpochSeedForHeightFromChain, Block_CalculateAutolykos2Hash,
    Block_RebuildAutolykos2Dag, Autolykos2_LightHash (dead).
  - DAG_BASE_GROWTH and the five DAG_MAX_*_SWING_* / DAG_SWING_PERCENT_DEN
    macros, all now unreachable.

Also: Block_CalculateAutolykos2Hash truncated the height to uint32 while the
light path takes uint64, so the two would have diverged above block 2^32; the
full width is now passed. Added a `dagvote <grow|hold|down>` REPL command and a
progress line during DAG generation, which is tens of seconds at production
sizes.

static_asserts now enforce DAG_MIN_SIZE <= DAG_BASE_SIZE <= DAG_MAX_SIZE and
32-byte alignment, so a misconfigured band fails the build instead of being
silently clamped.

NOTE: DAG_MIN_SIZE (2 GiB), DAG_BASE_SIZE (2 GiB), DAG_MAX_SIZE (8 GiB) and
DAG_EPOCH_STEP (1 GiB) are economic judgements, not derivations, and since the
vote cannot accelerate growth they are the entire upward story. Sanity-check
them before launch.

== Verification ==

  * Penalty: exact table match at d = 4/8/10/50/100/1000, zero within grace,
    saturation at MAX_DEPTH, and identical wall-clock protection when rebuilt
    at TARGET_BLOCK_TIME = 60.
  * DAG recurrence (30 assertions against the real objects): default growth,
    legacy all-zero headers read as grow, strict inequality at exactly 1/2 and
    exactly 7/8, one qualifying epoch freezes but does not shrink, two
    consecutive shrink, sustained shrink repeats, both clamps saturate.
  * Epoch seed: constant across an epoch, equal to hash(block[k*EL - 1]),
    genesis seed in epoch 0, and resolvable at exactly height == EPOCH_LENGTH.
  * Fail-closed: unresolvable params and a zero-byte DAG both reject.
  * Heavy/light equivalence across 3 epochs; heavy refuses a DAG built for the
    wrong epoch or size.
  * Two nodes across 3 epoch boundaries: B reached height 30 purely by
    receiving, then mined blocks A accepted; both fullverify Chain OK, zero
    rejections.
  * Restart mid-epoch: B restarted at height 28 derived epoch 3's seed as
    hash(block[23]) -- the boundary block, not the tip -- and kept producing
    blocks A accepted. This fails before the change.
  * Divergent votes: A voting hold and B voting grow computed identical size
    and seed, confirming the tally is chain-derived, not config-derived.
  * ThreadSanitizer across epoch rollovers under load: no new races.

include/autolykos2/autolykos2.h

@@ -32,7 +32,9 @@ bool Autolykos2_Hash(
 	uint8_t outHash[32]
 );
 
-bool Autolykos2_LightHash(const uint8_t* seed, blockchain_t* chain, uint64_t nonce, uint8_t* out);
+// Derives the DAG lanes it needs straight from the epoch seed, so it needs no DAG allocation and
+// stays correct for any height regardless of which epoch a DAG happens to be built for. Produces
+// exactly the same hash as Autolykos2_Hash against a DAG generated from the same seed and size.
 bool Autolykos2_LightHashAtHeight(
 	const uint8_t seed32[32],
 	const uint8_t* message,

include/block/block.h

@@ -18,7 +18,10 @@ typedef struct {
     uint8_t merkleRoot[32];
     uint32_t difficultyTarget; // Encoding: [1 byte exponent][3 byte coefficient]; Target = coefficient * 256^(exponent-3)
     uint8_t version;
-    uint8_t reserved[3];       // 3 bytes (Explicit padding for 8-byte alignment)
+    // reserved[0] carries the miner's DAG-size vote (DAG_VOTE_* in constants.h); reserved[1..2] must
+    // be zero. All three are inside the hashed header, so a vote is committed to by both the
+    // canonical hash and the PoW hash and cannot be altered after the block is mined.
+    uint8_t reserved[3];
 } block_header_t;
 #pragma pack(pop)
 
@@ -27,17 +30,49 @@ typedef struct {
     DynArr* transactions; // Array of signed_transaction_t, NOTE: Potentially move to a hashmap at some point for quick lookups.
 } block_t;
 
+// PoW validity is chain-relative: it needs the epoch DAG size and seed. chain.h includes this
+// header, so the tag declared there is forward-declared here to break the cycle.
+typedef struct blockchain blockchain_t;
+
 block_t* Block_Create();
 void Block_CalculateHash(const block_t* block, uint8_t* outHash);
 void Block_CalculateMerkleRoot(const block_t* block, uint8_t* outHash);
-void Block_CalculateAutolykos2Hash(const block_t* block, uint8_t* outHash);
-bool Block_RebuildAutolykos2Dag(size_t dagBytes, const uint8_t seed32[32]);
 void Block_AddTransaction(block_t* block, signed_transaction_t* tx);
 void Block_RemoveTransaction(block_t* block, uint8_t* txHash);
-bool Block_HasValidProofOfWork(const block_t* block);
+
+/**
+ * Autolykos2 PoW hashing.
+ *
+ * The heavy variant reads its lanes from the process-global DAG and is a MINING accelerator only;
+ * the light variant derives the same lanes from the epoch seed on demand. They are bit-for-bit
+ * equivalent by construction -- Autolykos2_DagGenerate fills lane i with exactly what
+ * ReadDagLaneFromSeed recomputes for lane i -- so a block mined through either verifies through
+ * either. Validation always uses the light path: it needs no allocation, which is what keeps the
+ * DAG a miner requirement rather than a full-node memory requirement, and it stays correct for
+ * blocks from earlier epochs (the heavy path can only ever answer for whichever epoch the global
+ * DAG was last built for).
+**/
+bool Block_EnsureAutolykos2Dag(uint64_t epochIndex, size_t dagBytes, const uint8_t seed32[32]);
+// Fails rather than answering from a DAG built for a different epoch or size, so it can never
+// silently hash against the wrong lanes.
+bool Block_PowHashHeavy(const block_t* block, uint64_t epochIndex, size_t dagBytes, uint8_t outHash[32]);
+bool Block_PowHashLight(const block_t* block, size_t dagBytes, const uint8_t seed32[32], uint8_t outHash[32]);
+
+// PoW check against explicitly supplied epoch parameters, for callers that resolve them once and
+// then iterate (the miner). Returns false if the hash cannot be computed -- never treat an
+// uncomputable proof as valid.
+bool Block_HasValidProofOfWorkWithParams(const block_t* block, uint64_t epochIndex,
+                                         size_t dagBytes, const uint8_t seed32[32]);
+
+// PoW check that resolves the epoch parameters for the block's own height from `chain`.
+bool Block_HasValidProofOfWork(const block_t* block, blockchain_t* chain);
+
+// Header vote field is a recognised value and the unused reserved bytes are zero.
+bool Block_HasValidVote(const block_t* block);
+
 bool Block_AllTransactionsValid(const block_t* block);
 bool Block_ValidateCoinbaseAndFees(const block_t* block, uint64_t expectedCoinbaseAmount, uint64_t* outTotalFees);
-bool Block_IsFullyValid(const block_t* block);
+bool Block_IsFullyValid(const block_t* block, blockchain_t* chain);
 void Block_ShutdownPowContext(void);
 void Block_Destroy(block_t* block);
 void Block_Print(const block_t* block);

include/block/chain.h

@@ -7,13 +7,41 @@
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdbool.h>
 #include <string.h>
+#include <pthread.h>
 #include <uint256.h>
 #include <storage/block_table.h>
 #include <balance_sheet.h>
 
+// One entry of the memoised DAG size recurrence, one per epoch. See Chain_DagParamsForHeight.
 typedef struct {
+    uint64_t sizeBytes;  // DAG size used by every block whose height falls in this epoch
+    bool downQualified;  // this epoch's own votes met the down supermajority
+} dag_epoch_state_t;
+
+// Tagged so block.h can forward-declare it: PoW validity depends on the chain (it needs the epoch
+// seed), but chain.h includes block.h, so the tag is what breaks the cycle.
+typedef struct blockchain {
     DynArr* blocks;
     size_t size;
+
+    /**
+     * Memoised DAG size recurrence: a pure cache of a function of the block headers, extended
+     * lazily and dropped whenever anything at or below the tip changes (every epoch's size depends
+     * on the votes of every epoch before it). It lives on the chain rather than in a global because
+     * a second, header-only blockchain_t is built to re-verify historical PoW, and the two must not
+     * share a cache.
+     *
+     * `dagEpochsComputed` counts valid `sizeBytes` entries. `downQualified` is only filled in for
+     * an epoch once the *following* entry has been computed, so it is valid on
+     * [0, dagEpochsComputed - 1).
+     *
+     * Guarded by `dagCacheLock`, which is always taken AFTER `chainLock` and is never held across a
+     * call back into chain.c.
+    **/
+    dag_epoch_state_t* dagEpochs;
+    size_t dagEpochsComputed;
+    size_t dagEpochsCapacity;
+    pthread_mutex_t dagCacheLock;
 } blockchain_t;
 
 blockchain_t* Chain_Create();
@@ -80,6 +108,25 @@ uint32_t Chain_GetTargetForHeight(blockchain_t* chain, uint64_t height);
 // Call after any change to the tip. Must NOT be called while holding `chainLock`.
 void Chain_OnTipAdvanced(blockchain_t* chain);
 
+// DAG
+/**
+ * The Autolykos2 DAG size and epoch seed that the block at `blockHeight` must be hashed against.
+ *
+ * This is the single source of truth for both, so the mining path and the verification path cannot
+ * drift apart. Size follows the default-grow recurrence gated by the miner votes in
+ * `header.reserved[0]` (see the DAG band in constants.h); the seed is epoch-aligned -- epoch 0 uses
+ * the genesis seed, epoch k uses the hash of the last block of epoch k-1 -- so it is constant for
+ * the whole epoch rather than changing every block.
+ *
+ * Requires the chain to hold every block below the start of `blockHeight`'s epoch, which is always
+ * true when validating or mining a block at that height. Returns false if it cannot produce both
+ * values; callers MUST treat that as an invalid proof rather than falling back to a default.
+ *
+ * Takes `chainLock` for reading internally. Must NOT be called while holding it.
+**/
+bool Chain_DagParamsForHeight(blockchain_t* chain, uint64_t blockHeight,
+                              size_t* outDagBytes, uint8_t outSeed[32]);
+
 // Work
 // Expected number of hashes to satisfy `difficultyTargetBits`, i.e. 2^256 / (target + 1).
 bool Chain_ComputeBlockWork(uint32_t difficultyTargetBits, uint256_t* outWork);

include/constants.h

@@ -55,7 +55,11 @@ static const int MAX_FORK_PROBE_ROUNDS = 3;
 // before it may be adopted, so a rented-hashrate attacker has to sustain the attack publicly
 // instead of winning by dumping a privately mined branch.
 //
-// penalty(B) = ceil(FACTOR_NUM/FACTOR_DEN * B^EXPONENT * TARGET_BLOCK_TIME / REF_BLOCK_TIME)
+// penalty(B) = ceil(FACTOR_NUM/FACTOR_DEN * B^EXPONENT * REF_BLOCK_TIME / TARGET_BLOCK_TIME)
+//
+// The block-time ratio is REF/TARGET, not TARGET/REF. penalty() counts BLOCKS, so the wall-clock
+// protection is penalty(B) * TARGET_BLOCK_TIME ~= B^EXPONENT * REF_BLOCK_TIME: TARGET_BLOCK_TIME
+// cancels and the protection is block-time-independent. See fetch_scheduler.c.
 //
 // Expressed as integer rationals on purpose: this feeds fork choice, so it must evaluate
 // identically on every node. Floating point is not acceptable here.
@@ -65,7 +69,8 @@ static const uint64_t REORG_PENALTY_FACTOR_DEN = 1ULL; // base scaling factor (t
 static const uint32_t REORG_PENALTY_EXPONENT = 2U; // exponent p in penalty ~ B^p
 static const uint64_t REORG_PENALTY_REF_BLOCK_TIME = 150ULL; // reference block time in seconds used by original scheme
 // Beyond this depth the penalty saturates. At the configured parameters penalty(1000) is already
-// ~600k blocks (over a year), so this only exists to keep the arithmetic away from overflow.
+// ~1.67M blocks (~4.75 years at a 90s block time), so this only exists to keep the arithmetic away
+// from overflow rather than to bound the penalty in any meaningful sense.
 static const uint64_t REORG_PENALTY_MAX_DEPTH = 1000ULL;
 
 // Upper bound on pooled orphan blocks. Orphans are accepted before the chain-derived difficulty
@@ -95,26 +100,58 @@ static const size_t MEDIAN_TIME_SPAN = 11U;
 // Keep this at 20 to match the canonical curve shape against a 2^64 atomic supply cap.
 #define MONERO_EMISSION_SPEED_FACTOR 20U
 
-// Future Autolykos2 constants:
+// Autolykos2 epoch / DAG constants.
 #define EPOCH_LENGTH 350000 // ~1 year at 90s
-#define DAG_BASE_GROWTH (1ULL << 30) // 1 GB per epoch, adjusted by acceleration
-//#define DAG_BASE_SIZE (6ULL << 30) // 6 GB, adjusted per cycle based off DAG_BASE_GROWTH
-#define DAG_BASE_SIZE (1ULL << 30) // TEMPORARY FOR TESTING
-// Swings - calculated as MIN(percentage, absolute GB) to prevent absurd swings from low hashrate or very large DAG growth.
-// Percentages are integer numerator/denominator pairs, never float literals: DAG size feeds PoW
-// verification, so it has to evaluate identically on every node.
-#define DAG_MAX_UP_SWING_PERCENT_NUM 15ULL // +15%
-#define DAG_MAX_DOWN_SWING_PERCENT_NUM 10ULL // -10%
-#define DAG_SWING_PERCENT_DEN 100ULL
-#define DAG_MAX_UP_SWING_GB (2ULL << 30) // 2 GB
-#define DAG_MAX_DOWN_SWING_GB (1ULL << 30) // 1 GB
-#define DAG_GENESIS_SEED 0x00 // Genesis seed is zeroes, every epoch's seed is the hash of the previous block, therefore unpredictable until the block is mined
+#define DAG_GENESIS_SEED 0x00 // Epoch 0's seed is all zeroes; epoch k's seed is the hash of the last
+                              // block of epoch k-1, so it is unpredictable until that block is mined.
 
 /**
- * Each epoch has 2 phases, connected logarithmically:
- * - Phase 1: Aggressive DAG growth (target is ~75% of the max cap) to kick out any ASICs, 30k blocks (roughly 1 month)
- * - Phase 2: Stable DAG growth (target is the max cap) to provide a stable environment for GPU miners, 320k blocks (roughly 11 months)
+ * DAG size band and the miner signal that moves within it.
+ *
+ * Growth is the DEFAULT: the size walks up by DAG_EPOCH_STEP every epoch unless miners actively
+ * brake it. There is deliberately no "grow faster" vote -- every signal a miner can express only
+ * slows the walk or reverses it. That is what makes the scheme safe against pool capture: under
+ * stratum-style pooled mining the pool builds the header, so it controls its share of the vote, and
+ * a pool that wanted a larger DAG to price smaller miners out simply has no lever to pull. The
+ * entire upward trajectory is set by DAG_EPOCH_STEP and DAG_MAX_SIZE, i.e. by release, not by vote.
+ *
+ * DAG_MIN_SIZE is the ASIC-resistance floor: it must stay above the on-die SRAM an ASIC could
+ * economically carry, because *this constant*, not the vote, is what secures the property. No vote
+ * outcome can go below it. DAG_MAX_SIZE is the intended destination rather than an emergency bound,
+ * since the DAG reaches it on its own -- pick it as the largest DAG miners should ever hold.
+ *
+ * NOTE: these three sizes are economic judgements, not derivations. Sanity-check them before
+ * launch. DAG_BASE_SIZE was previously commented as an intended 6 GiB; it now has to sit inside
+ * the band (see the static_assert below). Lowering the DAG for a test run means lowering
+ * DAG_MIN_SIZE too, not just DAG_BASE_SIZE.
 **/
+#define DAG_MIN_SIZE   (2ULL << 30) // 2 GiB -- ASIC-resistance floor
+#define DAG_BASE_SIZE  (2ULL << 30) // epoch 0 size
+#define DAG_MAX_SIZE   (8ULL << 30) // 8 GiB -- intended destination, ~6 unbraked years from base
+#define DAG_EPOCH_STEP (1ULL << 30) // 1 GiB drift per epoch, in either direction
+
+// Vote thresholds as integer numerator/denominator pairs, never float literals: this feeds PoW
+// verification, so every node must reach the same verdict. The tests cross-multiply rather than
+// divide, so there is no rounding to disagree on.
+#define DAG_BRAKE_NUM 1ULL
+#define DAG_BRAKE_DEN 2ULL // brake growth when hold+down votes exceed 1/2 of the epoch
+#define DAG_DOWN_NUM  7ULL
+#define DAG_DOWN_DEN  8ULL // shrink when down votes exceed 7/8 of the epoch, two epochs running
+
+// reserved[0] of the block header carries the vote. 0 must mean GROW: the point of this shape is
+// that inaction produces growth, so a miner that knows nothing about the vote contributes to the
+// intended default instead of silently freezing the schedule.
+#define DAG_VOTE_GROW 0u // default -- let the schedule run
+#define DAG_VOTE_HOLD 1u // brake: stop growing
+#define DAG_VOTE_DOWN 2u // reverse: shrink (needs a sustained supermajority to take effect)
+#define DAG_VOTE_MAX  DAG_VOTE_DOWN
+
+static_assert(DAG_MIN_SIZE <= DAG_BASE_SIZE && DAG_BASE_SIZE <= DAG_MAX_SIZE,
+              "DAG_BASE_SIZE must start inside [DAG_MIN_SIZE, DAG_MAX_SIZE]");
+static_assert(DAG_MIN_SIZE % 32ULL == 0ULL && DAG_MAX_SIZE % 32ULL == 0ULL &&
+              DAG_BASE_SIZE % 32ULL == 0ULL && DAG_EPOCH_STEP % 32ULL == 0ULL,
+              "Autolykos2 lane addressing requires every DAG size to be a multiple of 32");
+static_assert(DAG_EPOCH_STEP > 0ULL, "DAG_EPOCH_STEP must be positive or the DAG can never move");
 
 static const uint64_t M_CAP = 18446744073709551615ULL; // Max uint64
 static const uint64_t TAIL_EMISSION = 750000000000ULL; // 0.75 coins per block floor
@@ -226,76 +263,9 @@ static inline uint64_t CalculateBlockReward(uint256_t currentSupply, blockchain_
     return CalculateBlockRewardAtHeight(currentSupply, (uint64_t)Chain_Size(chain));
 }
 
-// Hashing DAG
-static inline size_t CalculateTargetDAGSize(blockchain_t* chain) {
-    // Base size plus (base growth * difficulty factor), adjusted by acceleration
-    if (!chain || !chain->blocks) { return 0; } // Invalid
-    uint64_t height = (uint64_t)Chain_Size(chain);
-    
-    if (height < EPOCH_LENGTH) {
-        return DAG_BASE_SIZE;
-    }
-
-    // Get the height - EPOCH_LENGTH block and the last block;
-    block_t* lastBlock = NULL;
-    block_t* epochStartBlock = NULL;
-    if (!Chain_GetBlockCopy(chain, Chain_Size(chain) - 1, &lastBlock) || !lastBlock) {
-        if (lastBlock) Block_Destroy(lastBlock);
-        return 0;
-    }
-    if (!Chain_GetBlockCopy(chain, (size_t)(Chain_Size(chain) - 1 - EPOCH_LENGTH), &epochStartBlock) || !epochStartBlock) {
-        Block_Destroy(lastBlock);
-        if (epochStartBlock) Block_Destroy(epochStartBlock);
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    int64_t difficultyDelta = (int64_t)epochStartBlock->header.difficultyTarget - (int64_t)lastBlock->header.difficultyTarget;
-    int64_t growth = (DAG_BASE_GROWTH * difficultyDelta); // Can be negative if difficulty has decreased, which is why we use int64_t
-
-    // Clamp
-    if (growth > 0) {
-        // Difficulty increased -> Clamp the UPWARD swing
-        int64_t maxUp = (int64_t)((DAG_BASE_SIZE * DAG_MAX_UP_SWING_PERCENT_NUM) / DAG_SWING_PERCENT_DEN);
-        if (growth > maxUp) growth = maxUp;
-        if (growth > (int64_t)DAG_MAX_UP_SWING_GB) growth = DAG_MAX_UP_SWING_GB;
-    } else {
-        // Difficulty decreased -> Clamp the DOWNWARD swing
-        int64_t maxDown = (int64_t)((DAG_BASE_SIZE * DAG_MAX_DOWN_SWING_PERCENT_NUM) / DAG_SWING_PERCENT_DEN);
-        if (-growth > maxDown) growth = -maxDown;
-        if (-growth > (int64_t)DAG_MAX_DOWN_SWING_GB) growth = -(int64_t)DAG_MAX_DOWN_SWING_GB;
-    }
-    
-    int64_t targetSize = (int64_t)DAG_BASE_SIZE + growth;
-    if (targetSize <= 0) {
-        Block_Destroy(lastBlock);
-        Block_Destroy(epochStartBlock);
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    size_t out = (size_t)targetSize;
-    Block_Destroy(lastBlock);
-    Block_Destroy(epochStartBlock);
-    return out;
-}
-
-static inline void GetNextDAGSeed(blockchain_t* chain, uint8_t outSeed[32]) {
-    if (!chain || !chain->blocks || !outSeed) { return; } // Invalid
-    uint64_t height = (uint64_t)Chain_Size(chain);
-
-    if (height < EPOCH_LENGTH) {
-        memset(outSeed, DAG_GENESIS_SEED, 32);
-        return;
-    }
-
-    block_t* prevBlock = NULL;
-    if (!Chain_GetBlockCopy(chain, Chain_Size(chain) - 1, &prevBlock) || !prevBlock) {
-        memset(outSeed, 0x00, 32); // Fallback to zeroes if we can't get the previous block for some reason; The caller should treat this as an error if height >= EPOCH_LENGTH
-        if (prevBlock) Block_Destroy(prevBlock);
-        return;
-    }
-
-    Block_CalculateHash(prevBlock, outSeed);
-    Block_Destroy(prevBlock);
-}
+// Hashing DAG: see Chain_DagParamsForHeight in block/chain.h. Both the size and the epoch seed are
+// derived from the chain by that one function, so the mining and verification paths cannot drift
+// apart. The previous CalculateTargetDAGSize/GetNextDAGSeed pair lived here, took chainLock
+// internally, was not epoch-aligned, and disagreed with the verifier's own copy in main.c.
 
 #endif