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Fix reorg penalty scaling direction and rebuild DAG sizing around a miner-signalled band

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Two consensus-parameter bugs, both latent today and both guaranteed to become
live splits later. Neither is a regression; both are cheap to fix now and
expensive to fix after launch.

== 1. The reorg penalty scaled with block time the wrong way ==

FetchScheduler_ComputeReorgPenaltyBlocks had TARGET_BLOCK_TIME in the numerator
and REORG_PENALTY_REF_BLOCK_TIME in the denominator. The penalty is counted in
BLOCKS, so the wall-clock protection it actually buys was

    penalty(d) * TARGET_BLOCK_TIME  ~  d^2 * T^2 / REF

i.e. quadratic in block time, when the stated intent in constants.h is
wall-clock equivalence to the reference scheme defined at REF_BLOCK_TIME = 150.
At T = 90 the chain got 54*d^2 seconds of protection instead of 150*d^2 --
2.78x weaker than intended -- and any future block-time reduction would have
weakened it further, silently.

Swapping the two makes T cancel out of the wall-clock figure:

    penalty(d) = ceil(d^2 * REF / T)   ->   protection ~ d^2 * REF seconds

Penalty in blocks, depth -> before/after: 4 -> 10/27, 8 -> 39/107,
10 -> 60/167, 50 -> 1500/4167, 100 -> 6000/16667.

Verified by rebuilding at TARGET_BLOCK_TIME = 60: wall-clock protection is now
identical at both block times (2400s, 9600s, 15000s, ...), ratio 1.0000. Under
the old formula 60s blocks would have been 56% weaker.

Still integer-only: the ceiling division and saturation guards are unchanged,
and numeratorScale only moves 90 -> 150 while `raised` stays bounded by
REORG_PENALTY_MAX_DEPTH^2 = 1e6, nowhere near overflow.

This is fork choice, not block validity, so mixed-version nodes converge once
the longer penalty expires and no block ever becomes invalid.

== 2. DAG sizing was a fail-open consensus split waiting on block 350000 ==

Fixed, in rough order of severity:

  * FAIL-OPEN PoW. Block_CalculateAutolykos2Hash memset the hash to zero on any
    failure, and zero compares below every target -- so a DAG that was missing,
    mis-sized or had failed to build made *every* block pass PoW validation
    instead of rejecting it. PoW checks now fail closed.

  * TWO DIVERGENT IMPLEMENTATIONS of the same rule: CalculateTargetDAGSize in
    constants.h (mining) and ComputeEpochDagBytesForHeightFromChain in main.c
    (verification). They already disagreed at exactly height == EPOCH_LENGTH,
    where the constants.h copy underflowed size_t computing
    `Chain_Size - 1 - EPOCH_LENGTH` and returned 0.

  * A MEANINGLESS DIFFICULTY COUPLING. difficultyTarget is compact-encoded
    [1B exponent][3B coefficient]; subtracting two compact values mixes
    exponent and mantissa. The first real retarget yields a delta of 900649,
    which times DAG_BASE_GROWTH is ~967 TB, so the result was always clamped
    and the "proportional" term degenerated to a binary base+maxUp/base-maxDown
    switch. The size also never accumulated -- it was always recomputed from
    the constant base -- so the documented 1 GB/epoch growth could not happen.

  * A NON-EPOCH-ALIGNED SEED. GetNextDAGSeed returned hash(tip) while the
    verifier correctly used hash(block[epochIndex * EPOCH_LENGTH - 1]). The
    `chainSize % EPOCH_LENGTH == 0` rebuild guard masked this while running,
    but startup called it at an arbitrary height -- so a node restarted
    mid-epoch built a DAG from a different seed than one that had run straight
    through the boundary, and its blocks were rejected.

  * UNSIGNED PROMOTION. `DAG_BASE_GROWTH * difficultyDelta` promoted the signed
    delta to unsigned long long and wrapped before being assigned back to
    int64_t; the main.c copy cast first, so the two also differed in overflow
    behaviour. Both are gone.

  * A LEAK on the `targetSize <= 0` path in main.c (both block copies).

  * A USE-AFTER-FREE at every epoch boundary: Block_RebuildAutolykos2Dag ran
    DagClear -> DagAllocate -> DagGenerate from whichever thread advanced the
    tip, freeing ctx->dag.buf while miners read it.

  * GetAutolykos2Ctx called DagAllocate without DagGenerate, leaving
    dag.len == 0 so every heavy hash failed -- which, combined with the
    fail-open above, meant "everything is valid". It also memset 1 GiB that
    DagGenerate immediately overwrote.

  * TOCTOU / lock reentrancy: CalculateTargetDAGSize called Chain_Size 4x and
    Chain_GetBlockCopy 2x, each taking chainLock for reading, making it unsafe
    to call from a write-locked section.

--- New sizing rule: default-grow inside a hard band ---

DAG size now follows a recurrence gated by a miner signal in the block header,
clamped to [DAG_MIN_SIZE, DAG_MAX_SIZE]:

    brake  = (hold + down) * DAG_BRAKE_DEN > EPOCH_LENGTH * DAG_BRAKE_NUM
    downQ  =          down * DAG_DOWN_DEN  > EPOCH_LENGTH * DAG_DOWN_NUM

    downQ(k) && downQ(k-1) -> size -= DAG_EPOCH_STEP   (floored at DAG_MIN_SIZE)
    brake                  -> size unchanged
    otherwise              -> size += DAG_EPOCH_STEP   (capped at DAG_MAX_SIZE)

Growth is the default and there is deliberately NO up-vote: every signal a
miner can express only slows the walk or reverses it. Under stratum-style
pooled mining the pool builds the header and therefore controls its share of
the vote, so the mechanism has to be safe under pool capture -- and it is,
because the lever a pool would want (grow the DAG to price out smaller miners)
does not exist. This is NOT because upward capture would be self-defeating: it
would in fact be profitable, since the fixed block reward redistributes to
whoever survives and difficulty retargets down. The protection is the absence
of the lever. The whole upward trajectory is therefore governance
(DAG_EPOCH_STEP, DAG_MAX_SIZE), not signalling.

Braking keeps the DAG small, which helps old hardware and only costs ASIC
resistance -- bounded by DAG_MIN_SIZE, which is the constant that actually
secures the property. Shrinking needs a supermajority sustained across two
consecutive epochs; that gates the onset only, so miners genuinely being
squeezed get relief every epoch rather than every other one.

Thresholds are cross-multiplied rather than divided, so there is no rounding
for nodes to disagree on, and the denominator is the constant epoch length
rather than blocks-observed, so a partial epoch cannot read as a stronger
signal than it is. No floating point anywhere on this path.

--- Header vote field ---

reserved[0] carries the vote: 0 = grow (default), 1 = hold, 2 = down.
reserved[1..2] must be zero. All three already sat inside the packed, hashed
header, so the vote is committed to by both the canonical hash and the PoW hash
and cannot be altered after mining -- no wire-format or hash-layout change.

0 must mean grow, because the point of this shape is that inaction produces
growth; it also means a miner that knows nothing about the vote contributes to
the intended default rather than silently freezing the schedule.

Rejecting unrecognised vote values and non-zero spare bytes is a new validity
rule. It closes 24 bits of undefined-meaning malleable header space.

--- Validation moves to the light path ---

Autolykos2_DagGenerate fills lane i with exactly what ReadDagLaneFromSeed
recomputes for lane i -- Blake2b(seed || (i/2)_LE64), half i&1 -- so the DAG is
a pure cache and the two hashing paths are bit-for-bit equivalent. Validation
therefore uses the light path: no allocation, correct for any epoch rather than
only whichever one the global DAG happens to hold, and the DAG band becomes a
miner requirement rather than a full-node memory requirement.

Chain_OnTipAdvanced no longer rebuilds the DAG at all. MineBlock builds it on
demand for the height it is working on, so a node that does not mine never
allocates one, generation stays off the tip-advance path, and the buffer is
only ever touched by the miner (the ctx mutex remains as a backstop).

--- API changes ---

  + Chain_DagParamsForHeight(chain, height, &dagBytes, seed) -- single source
    of truth for both the size and the epoch seed, backed by a memoised
    per-epoch table on blockchain_t. The table is a pure cache of a function of
    the headers, extended lazily and dropped whenever anything at or below the
    tip changes; it lives on the chain rather than in a global because a
    second, header-only chain is built to re-verify historical PoW. Guarded by
    a per-chain mutex, always taken after chainLock.
  + Block_EnsureAutolykos2Dag / Block_PowHashHeavy / Block_PowHashLight.
    The heavy variant verifies the epoch and size itself, so it can never
    answer from a DAG built for another epoch.
  + Block_HasValidProofOfWorkWithParams -- resolve-once form. MineBlock called
    Block_HasValidProofOfWork inside its nonce loop, so resolving from the
    chain per attempt would have taken chainLock millions of times per block.
  + Block_HasValidVote.
  ~ Block_HasValidProofOfWork / Block_IsFullyValid now take the chain, because
    PoW validity genuinely is chain-relative. blockchain_t gained a struct tag
    so block.h can forward-declare it.
  - CalculateTargetDAGSize, GetNextDAGSeed, ComputeEpochDagBytesForHeightFromChain,
    ComputeEpochSeedForHeightFromChain, Block_CalculateAutolykos2Hash,
    Block_RebuildAutolykos2Dag, Autolykos2_LightHash (dead).
  - DAG_BASE_GROWTH and the five DAG_MAX_*_SWING_* / DAG_SWING_PERCENT_DEN
    macros, all now unreachable.

Also: Block_CalculateAutolykos2Hash truncated the height to uint32 while the
light path takes uint64, so the two would have diverged above block 2^32; the
full width is now passed. Added a `dagvote <grow|hold|down>` REPL command and a
progress line during DAG generation, which is tens of seconds at production
sizes.

static_asserts now enforce DAG_MIN_SIZE <= DAG_BASE_SIZE <= DAG_MAX_SIZE and
32-byte alignment, so a misconfigured band fails the build instead of being
silently clamped.

NOTE: DAG_MIN_SIZE (2 GiB), DAG_BASE_SIZE (2 GiB), DAG_MAX_SIZE (8 GiB) and
DAG_EPOCH_STEP (1 GiB) are economic judgements, not derivations, and since the
vote cannot accelerate growth they are the entire upward story. Sanity-check
them before launch.

== Verification ==

  * Penalty: exact table match at d = 4/8/10/50/100/1000, zero within grace,
    saturation at MAX_DEPTH, and identical wall-clock protection when rebuilt
    at TARGET_BLOCK_TIME = 60.
  * DAG recurrence (30 assertions against the real objects): default growth,
    legacy all-zero headers read as grow, strict inequality at exactly 1/2 and
    exactly 7/8, one qualifying epoch freezes but does not shrink, two
    consecutive shrink, sustained shrink repeats, both clamps saturate.
  * Epoch seed: constant across an epoch, equal to hash(block[k*EL - 1]),
    genesis seed in epoch 0, and resolvable at exactly height == EPOCH_LENGTH.
  * Fail-closed: unresolvable params and a zero-byte DAG both reject.
  * Heavy/light equivalence across 3 epochs; heavy refuses a DAG built for the
    wrong epoch or size.
  * Two nodes across 3 epoch boundaries: B reached height 30 purely by
    receiving, then mined blocks A accepted; both fullverify Chain OK, zero
    rejections.
  * Restart mid-epoch: B restarted at height 28 derived epoch 3's seed as
    hash(block[23]) -- the boundary block, not the tip -- and kept producing
    blocks A accepted. This fails before the change.
  * Divergent votes: A voting hold and B voting grow computed identical size
    and seed, confirming the tally is chain-derived, not config-derived.
  * ThreadSanitizer across epoch rollovers under load: no new races.
This commit is contained in:
dcrubro
2026-07-30 19:32:10 +02:00
parent 4d39614cb5
commit 0e721ca389
10 changed files with 612 additions and 272 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
src/autolykos2/autolykos2.c
-31
View File
@@ -409,37 +409,6 @@ bool Autolykos2_Hash(
);
}
bool Autolykos2_LightHash(const uint8_t* seed, blockchain_t* chain, uint64_t nonce, uint8_t* out) {
if (!seed || !chain || !out) {
return false;
}
const uint64_t height = (uint64_t)Chain_Size(chain);
const size_t dagBytes = CalculateTargetDAGSize(chain);
if (dagBytes < 32 || (dagBytes % 32) != 0) {
return false;
}
const size_t laneCount64 = dagBytes / 32u;
if (laneCount64 == 0 || laneCount64 > UINT32_MAX) {
return false;
}
// Light path derives the needed DAG lanes from seed on-demand, no large DAG allocation required.
return Autolykos2_HashCore(
seed,
seed,
seed,
32,
nonce,
height,
(uint32_t)laneCount64,
NULL,
false,
out
);
}
bool Autolykos2_LightHashAtHeight(
const uint8_t seed32[32],
const uint8_t* message,
src/block/block.c
+125 -37
View File
@@ -1,45 +1,118 @@
#include <block/block.h>
#include <block/chain.h>
#include <autolykos2/autolykos2.h>
#include <utils.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <pthread.h>
/**
* The process-global mining DAG.
*
* Guarded by `g_powCtxLock` because generation frees and reallocates the buffer that hashing reads
* from: without the lock, an epoch rollover would pull the DAG out from under a miner mid-hash.
* Only the miner ever builds or reads this -- validation goes through the light path -- so the lock
* is essentially uncontended, and a node that does not mine never allocates a DAG at all.
**/
static Autolykos2Context* g_autolykos2Ctx = NULL;
static pthread_mutex_t g_powCtxLock = PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER;
static uint64_t g_dagEpoch = 0;
static bool g_dagReady = false;
static Autolykos2Context* GetAutolykos2Ctx(void) {
// Caller must hold `g_powCtxLock`.
static Autolykos2Context* GetAutolykos2CtxLocked(void) {
if (!g_autolykos2Ctx) {
g_autolykos2Ctx = Autolykos2_Create();
if (!g_autolykos2Ctx) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to create Autolykos2 context\n");
exit(1);
}
Autolykos2_DagAllocate(g_autolykos2Ctx, DAG_BASE_SIZE);
// Deliberately no DagAllocate here. Allocating without generating leaves dag.len == 0, so
// every heavy hash fails -- which used to be indistinguishable from a valid proof, because
// the failure path handed back a zeroed hash that compares below every target.
}
return g_autolykos2Ctx;
}
void Block_ShutdownPowContext(void) {
pthread_mutex_lock(&g_powCtxLock);
if (g_autolykos2Ctx) {
Autolykos2_Destroy(g_autolykos2Ctx);
g_autolykos2Ctx = NULL;
}
g_dagReady = false;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&g_powCtxLock);
}
bool Block_RebuildAutolykos2Dag(size_t dagBytes, const uint8_t seed32[32]) {
if (!seed32 || dagBytes == 0) {
bool Block_EnsureAutolykos2Dag(uint64_t epochIndex, size_t dagBytes, const uint8_t seed32[32]) {
if (!seed32 || dagBytes < 32u || (dagBytes % 32u) != 0u) {
return false;
}
Autolykos2Context* ctx = GetAutolykos2Ctx();
if (!ctx) {
return false;
pthread_mutex_lock(&g_powCtxLock);
// Already built for this epoch at this size: generation is seconds of work, so never redo it.
if (g_dagReady && g_autolykos2Ctx && g_dagEpoch == epochIndex &&
Autolykos2_DagSize(g_autolykos2Ctx) == dagBytes) {
pthread_mutex_unlock(&g_powCtxLock);
return true;
}
Autolykos2Context* ctx = GetAutolykos2CtxLocked();
g_dagReady = false; // the buffer is about to be invalid; no heavy hash may run against it
// Generation is one Blake2b per 64 bytes, single-threaded, so a multi-GiB DAG is tens of
// seconds. Say so rather than leaving the miner looking hung.
printf("Generating the epoch %llu mining DAG (%zu MiB), this takes a moment...\n",
(unsigned long long)epochIndex, dagBytes >> 20);
fflush(stdout);
Autolykos2_DagClear(ctx);
if (!Autolykos2_DagAllocate(ctx, dagBytes)) {
const bool ok = Autolykos2_DagAllocate(ctx, dagBytes) && Autolykos2_DagGenerate(ctx, seed32);
if (ok) {
g_dagEpoch = epochIndex;
g_dagReady = true;
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&g_powCtxLock);
return ok;
}
bool Block_PowHashHeavy(const block_t* block, uint64_t epochIndex, size_t dagBytes, uint8_t outHash[32]) {
if (!block || !outHash) {
return false;
}
return Autolykos2_DagGenerate(ctx, seed32);
pthread_mutex_lock(&g_powCtxLock);
// Checking the epoch and size here, rather than trusting the caller to have built the right
// DAG, is what makes this impossible to misuse: an unbuilt or stale DAG yields false and the
// caller falls back to deriving the lanes from the seed.
const bool usable = g_dagReady && g_autolykos2Ctx && g_dagEpoch == epochIndex &&
Autolykos2_DagSize(g_autolykos2Ctx) == dagBytes;
const bool ok = usable &&
Autolykos2_Hash(
g_autolykos2Ctx,
(const uint8_t*)&block->header,
sizeof(block_header_t),
block->header.nonce,
block->header.blockNumber, // full 64-bit width; the light path takes uint64
outHash);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&g_powCtxLock);
return ok;
}
bool Block_PowHashLight(const block_t* block, size_t dagBytes, const uint8_t seed32[32], uint8_t outHash[32]) {
if (!block || !seed32 || !outHash) {
return false;
}
return Autolykos2_LightHashAtHeight(
seed32,
(const uint8_t*)&block->header,
sizeof(block_header_t),
block->header.nonce,
block->header.blockNumber,
dagBytes,
outHash);
}
block_t* Block_Create() {
@@ -133,30 +206,6 @@ void Block_CalculateMerkleRoot(const block_t* block, uint8_t* outHash) {
free(next);
}
void Block_CalculateAutolykos2Hash(const block_t* block, uint8_t* outHash) {
if (!block || !outHash) {
return;
}
// PoW hash is computed from the block header, while canonical block hash remains SHA256.
Autolykos2Context* ctx = GetAutolykos2Ctx();
if (!ctx) {
memset(outHash, 0, 32);
return;
}
if (!Autolykos2_Hash(
ctx,
(const uint8_t*)&block->header,
sizeof(block_header_t),
block->header.nonce,
(uint32_t)block->header.blockNumber,
outHash
)) {
memset(outHash, 0, 32);
}
}
void Block_AddTransaction(block_t* block, signed_transaction_t* tx) {
if (!block || !tx || !block->transactions) {
return;
@@ -189,7 +238,8 @@ static int Uint256_CompareBE(const uint8_t a[32], const uint8_t b[32]) {
return 0;
}
bool Block_HasValidProofOfWork(const block_t* block) {
bool Block_HasValidProofOfWorkWithParams(const block_t* block, uint64_t epochIndex,
size_t dagBytes, const uint8_t seed32[32]) {
if (!block) {
return false;
}
@@ -199,12 +249,49 @@ bool Block_HasValidProofOfWork(const block_t* block) {
return false;
}
// Prefer the prebuilt DAG when it is provably the one for this block's epoch and size -- the
// miner keeps it warm, and reading a lane beats recomputing it -- otherwise derive the lanes
// from the epoch seed. The two produce identical hashes, so which one runs is invisible to
// consensus; only speed differs.
uint8_t hash[32];
Block_CalculateAutolykos2Hash(block, hash);
if (!Block_PowHashHeavy(block, epochIndex, dagBytes, hash) &&
!Block_PowHashLight(block, dagBytes, seed32, hash)) {
// Fail CLOSED. This used to hand back a zeroed hash on any failure and compare that to the
// target -- and zero is below every target, so a DAG that was missing, mis-sized or failed
// to build made the PoW check pass for every block instead of rejecting them.
return false;
}
return Uint256_CompareBE(hash, target) <= 0;
}
bool Block_HasValidProofOfWork(const block_t* block, blockchain_t* chain) {
if (!block || !chain) {
return false;
}
size_t dagBytes = 0;
uint8_t seed[32];
if (!Chain_DagParamsForHeight(chain, block->header.blockNumber, &dagBytes, seed)) {
return false;
}
const uint64_t epochIndex = block->header.blockNumber / (uint64_t)EPOCH_LENGTH;
return Block_HasValidProofOfWorkWithParams(block, epochIndex, dagBytes, seed);
}
bool Block_HasValidVote(const block_t* block) {
if (!block) {
return false;
}
// Unrecognised vote values and non-zero spare bytes are rejected rather than ignored, so the
// header has no bits whose meaning is undefined and nothing to grind for extra nonce space.
return block->header.reserved[0] <= (uint8_t)DAG_VOTE_MAX &&
block->header.reserved[1] == 0u &&
block->header.reserved[2] == 0u;
}
bool Block_AllTransactionsValid(const block_t* block) {
if (!block || !block->transactions) {
return false;
@@ -296,7 +383,7 @@ bool Block_ValidateCoinbaseAndFees(const block_t* block, uint64_t expectedCoinba
return true;
}
bool Block_IsFullyValid(const block_t* block) {
bool Block_IsFullyValid(const block_t* block, blockchain_t* chain) {
bool merkleValid = false;
uint8_t calculatedMerkleRoot[32];
if (block && block->transactions) {
@@ -304,7 +391,8 @@ bool Block_IsFullyValid(const block_t* block) {
merkleValid = (memcmp(calculatedMerkleRoot, block->header.merkleRoot, 32) == 0);
}
return Block_HasValidProofOfWork(block) && Block_AllTransactionsValid(block) && DynArr_size(block->transactions) > 0 && merkleValid;
return Block_HasValidVote(block) && Block_HasValidProofOfWork(block, chain) &&
Block_AllTransactionsValid(block) && DynArr_size(block->transactions) > 0 && merkleValid;
}
void Block_Destroy(block_t* block) {
src/block/chain.c
+230 -5
View File
@@ -181,6 +181,27 @@ bool Chain_RecomputeRuntimeState(blockchain_t* chain) {
return true;
}
/**
* Drop the memoised DAG size recurrence.
*
* Every epoch's size is folded from the votes of every epoch before it, so any change at or below
* the tip invalidates the whole table. It is only a cache -- rebuilding it costs one pass over the
* headers reading a single byte each -- so blowing it away wholesale is both correct and cheap,
* and far safer than trying to work out which suffix a reorg actually disturbed.
*
* Takes `dagCacheLock`. Safe to call while holding `chainLock` (that is the required lock order);
* must NOT be called while already holding `dagCacheLock`.
**/
static void Chain_InvalidateDagEpochs(blockchain_t* chain) {
if (!chain) {
return;
}
pthread_mutex_lock(&chain->dagCacheLock);
chain->dagEpochsComputed = 0;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&chain->dagCacheLock);
}
static void Chain_ClearBlocks(blockchain_t* chain) {
if (!chain || !chain->blocks) {
return;
@@ -196,6 +217,7 @@ static void Chain_ClearBlocks(blockchain_t* chain) {
DynArr_erase(chain->blocks);
chain->size = 0;
Chain_InvalidateDagEpochs(chain);
}
blockchain_t* Chain_Create() {
@@ -207,6 +229,15 @@ blockchain_t* Chain_Create() {
ptr->blocks = DYNARR_CREATE(block_t, 1);
ptr->size = 0;
ptr->dagEpochs = NULL;
ptr->dagEpochsComputed = 0;
ptr->dagEpochsCapacity = 0;
if (pthread_mutex_init(&ptr->dagCacheLock, NULL) != 0) {
DynArr_destroy(ptr->blocks);
free(ptr);
return NULL;
}
return ptr;
}
@@ -216,6 +247,8 @@ void Chain_Destroy(blockchain_t* chain) {
Chain_ClearBlocks(chain);
DynArr_destroy(chain->blocks);
}
free(chain->dagEpochs);
pthread_mutex_destroy(&chain->dagCacheLock);
free(chain);
}
}
@@ -557,6 +590,9 @@ static bool Chain_RollbackToHeightLocked(blockchain_t* chain, size_t height) {
chain->size = DynArr_size(chain->blocks);
currentBlockHeight = chain->size ? (uint64_t)(chain->size - 1) : 0ULL;
// Blocks below the old tip are gone, so the DAG recurrence folded from their votes is stale.
Chain_InvalidateDagEpochs(chain);
// Rebuild balance sheet from scratch up to current chain size
BalanceSheet_Destroy();
BalanceSheet_Init();
@@ -1678,6 +1714,195 @@ bool Chain_ComputeBranchWork(block_t** blocks, size_t count, uint256_t* outWork)
return true;
}
/**
* Grow the memoised epoch table to hold at least `needed` entries.
* Caller must hold `chain->dagCacheLock`.
**/
static bool Chain_ReserveDagEpochsLocked(blockchain_t* chain, size_t needed) {
if (needed <= chain->dagEpochsCapacity) {
return true;
}
size_t capacity = chain->dagEpochsCapacity ? chain->dagEpochsCapacity : 8u;
while (capacity < needed) {
if (capacity > SIZE_MAX / 2u) {
return false;
}
capacity *= 2u;
}
dag_epoch_state_t* grown =
(dag_epoch_state_t*)realloc(chain->dagEpochs, capacity * sizeof(dag_epoch_state_t));
if (!grown) {
return false;
}
chain->dagEpochs = grown;
chain->dagEpochsCapacity = capacity;
return true;
}
/**
* Fold the DAG size recurrence forward until entry `epochIndex` is valid.
*
* Entry k's size comes from the votes cast during epoch k-1, so extending to k requires blocks
* [0, k * EPOCH_LENGTH) to all be present. Growth is the default: the size only stays put or falls
* when miners actively say so, and there is no vote that makes it climb faster.
*
* Caller must hold `chainLock` (read) and `chain->dagCacheLock`.
**/
static bool Chain_ExtendDagEpochsLocked(blockchain_t* chain, size_t epochIndex) {
if (!chain || !chain->blocks) {
return false;
}
if (!Chain_ReserveDagEpochsLocked(chain, epochIndex + 1u)) {
return false;
}
if (chain->dagEpochsComputed == 0) {
chain->dagEpochs[0].sizeBytes = DAG_BASE_SIZE;
chain->dagEpochs[0].downQualified = false;
chain->dagEpochsComputed = 1;
}
const size_t chainSize = DynArr_size(chain->blocks);
const size_t epochLength = (size_t)EPOCH_LENGTH;
for (size_t k = chain->dagEpochsComputed; k <= epochIndex; ++k) {
const size_t prev = k - 1u; // the epoch whose votes decide entry k
const size_t from = prev * epochLength;
const size_t to = from + epochLength; // exclusive
if (to > chainSize) {
// The epoch that would decide this entry has not been fully mined yet.
return false;
}
uint64_t holdVotes = 0;
uint64_t downVotes = 0;
for (size_t i = from; i < to; ++i) {
const block_t* blk = (const block_t*)DynArr_at(chain->blocks, i);
if (!blk) {
return false;
}
// Anything other than HOLD or DOWN counts as GROW. The accept path rejects values
// above DAG_VOTE_MAX, so in practice the only other value that reaches here is GROW.
const uint8_t vote = blk->header.reserved[0];
if (vote == DAG_VOTE_HOLD) {
holdVotes++;
} else if (vote == DAG_VOTE_DOWN) {
downVotes++;
}
}
// Cross-multiplied rather than divided, so there is no rounding for nodes to disagree on.
// The denominator is the constant epoch length, not the number of blocks looked at, so a
// partial epoch can never be read as a stronger signal than it is.
const uint64_t epochBlocks = (uint64_t)EPOCH_LENGTH;
const bool brake = (holdVotes + downVotes) * DAG_BRAKE_DEN > epochBlocks * DAG_BRAKE_NUM;
const bool downQualified = downVotes * DAG_DOWN_DEN > epochBlocks * DAG_DOWN_NUM;
chain->dagEpochs[prev].downQualified = downQualified;
const bool priorDownQualified = (prev >= 1u) ? chain->dagEpochs[prev - 1u].downQualified : false;
const uint64_t prevSize = chain->dagEpochs[prev].sizeBytes;
uint64_t next;
// Order matters: a qualifying down vote also satisfies the brake condition (down > 7/8
// implies hold+down > 1/2), so testing the brake first would make shrinking impossible.
if (downQualified && priorDownQualified) {
// Shrinking needs the supermajority sustained across two consecutive epochs. That gates
// the *onset* only -- it is deliberately not reset afterwards, so miners who are
// genuinely being squeezed keep getting relief every epoch rather than every other one.
next = (prevSize > DAG_MIN_SIZE + DAG_EPOCH_STEP) ? (prevSize - DAG_EPOCH_STEP)
: (uint64_t)DAG_MIN_SIZE;
} else if (brake) {
next = prevSize;
} else {
next = (prevSize + DAG_EPOCH_STEP < DAG_MAX_SIZE) ? (prevSize + DAG_EPOCH_STEP)
: (uint64_t)DAG_MAX_SIZE;
}
chain->dagEpochs[k].sizeBytes = next;
chain->dagEpochs[k].downQualified = false; // filled in when entry k+1 is folded
chain->dagEpochsComputed = k + 1u;
}
return true;
}
/**
* Epoch-aligned DAG seed for `blockHeight`: the genesis seed in epoch 0, otherwise the hash of the
* last block of the previous epoch. Constant for a whole epoch, which is what lets the DAG be
* generated once per epoch instead of once per block.
*
* Caller must hold `chainLock`.
**/
static bool Chain_EpochDagSeedForHeightLocked(blockchain_t* chain, uint64_t blockHeight, uint8_t outSeed[32]) {
const uint64_t epochIndex = blockHeight / (uint64_t)EPOCH_LENGTH;
if (epochIndex == 0) {
memset(outSeed, DAG_GENESIS_SEED, 32);
return true;
}
const uint64_t seedBlockNumber = (epochIndex * (uint64_t)EPOCH_LENGTH) - 1ULL;
if (seedBlockNumber >= (uint64_t)DynArr_size(chain->blocks)) {
return false;
}
const block_t* seedBlock = (const block_t*)DynArr_at(chain->blocks, (size_t)seedBlockNumber);
if (!seedBlock) {
return false;
}
Block_CalculateHash(seedBlock, outSeed);
return true;
}
bool Chain_DagParamsForHeight(blockchain_t* chain, uint64_t blockHeight,
size_t* outDagBytes, uint8_t outSeed[32]) {
if (!chain || !chain->blocks || !outDagBytes || !outSeed) {
return false;
}
const size_t epochIndex = (size_t)(blockHeight / (uint64_t)EPOCH_LENGTH);
uint64_t bytes = 0;
bool ok = false;
pthread_rwlock_rdlock(&chainLock);
// Lock order is chainLock -> dagCacheLock, everywhere. Nothing under dagCacheLock calls back
// into chain.c, so this pair cannot deadlock.
pthread_mutex_lock(&chain->dagCacheLock);
if (Chain_ExtendDagEpochsLocked(chain, epochIndex)) {
bytes = chain->dagEpochs[epochIndex].sizeBytes;
ok = true;
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&chain->dagCacheLock);
if (ok) {
ok = Chain_EpochDagSeedForHeightLocked(chain, blockHeight, outSeed);
}
pthread_rwlock_unlock(&chainLock);
if (!ok) {
return false;
}
// Autolykos2 addresses the DAG in 32-byte lanes. A size that is zero or not a multiple of 32
// would make hashing fail, and a proof that cannot be computed must never read as valid.
if (bytes < 32ULL || (bytes % 32ULL) != 0ULL) {
return false;
}
*outDagBytes = (size_t)bytes;
return true;
}
void Chain_OnTipAdvanced(blockchain_t* chain) {
if (!chain || !chain->blocks) {
return;
@@ -1689,9 +1914,9 @@ void Chain_OnTipAdvanced(blockchain_t* chain) {
// (mining, P2P accept, sync, orphan attach, reorg) stays on the same difficulty as its peers.
difficultyTarget = Chain_GetTargetForHeight(chain, (uint64_t)chainSize);
if (chainSize % EPOCH_LENGTH == 0 && chainSize > 0) {
uint8_t dagSeed[32];
GetNextDAGSeed(chain, dagSeed);
(void)Block_RebuildAutolykos2Dag(CalculateTargetDAGSize(chain), dagSeed);
}
// The epoch DAG is deliberately NOT rebuilt here. It is a mining accelerator only -- validation
// derives its lanes from the epoch seed, so a node that does not mine never allocates one --
// and MineBlock builds it on demand for the height it is working on. Keeping generation off
// this path matters twice over: it is seconds of work per epoch, and it used to run from
// whichever thread happened to advance the tip, freeing the buffer under any miner mid-hash.
}
src/main.c
+91 -96
View File
@@ -77,14 +77,33 @@ static void ApplyRuntimeConfigFromEnv(void) {
uint32_t difficultyTarget = INITIAL_DIFFICULTY;
static bool MineBlock(block_t* block) {
if (!block) {
static bool MineBlock(blockchain_t* chain, block_t* block) {
if (!chain || !block) {
return false;
}
// Resolve the epoch parameters ONCE. Doing it per nonce would take chainLock millions of times
// per block and contend with every network thread.
size_t dagBytes = 0;
uint8_t seed[32];
if (!Chain_DagParamsForHeight(chain, block->header.blockNumber, &dagBytes, seed)) {
fprintf(stderr, "failed to resolve epoch DAG parameters for height %llu\n",
(unsigned long long)block->header.blockNumber);
return false;
}
// Build the DAG for this block's epoch up front. It is only a speedup -- the check falls back
// to deriving the same lanes from the seed -- so a machine that cannot allocate one still
// mines, just slower.
const uint64_t epochIndex = block->header.blockNumber / (uint64_t)EPOCH_LENGTH;
if (!Block_EnsureAutolykos2Dag(epochIndex, dagBytes, seed)) {
fprintf(stderr, "could not build the epoch %llu DAG (%zu bytes); mining via the slow path\n",
(unsigned long long)epochIndex, dagBytes);
}
for (uint64_t nonce = 0;; ++nonce) {
block->header.nonce = nonce;
if (Block_HasValidProofOfWork(block)) {
if (Block_HasValidProofOfWorkWithParams(block, epochIndex, dagBytes, seed)) {
return true;
}
@@ -111,12 +130,22 @@ static bool FlushChainAndSheet(blockchain_t* chain,
return chainSaved && sheetSaved;
}
/**
* This node's DAG-size vote, stamped into every block it mines. DAG_VOTE_GROW is the default and
* means "let the schedule run" -- there is deliberately no vote that makes the DAG grow faster, so
* the only thing a miner can express is to brake or reverse it. Settable at runtime via `dagvote`.
**/
static uint8_t g_dagVote = (uint8_t)DAG_VOTE_GROW;
static block_t* BuildNextBlock(blockchain_t* chain, uint32_t difficultyTarget) {
block_t* block = Block_Create();
if (!block) {
return NULL;
}
block->header.reserved[0] = g_dagVote;
block->header.reserved[1] = 0;
block->header.reserved[2] = 0;
block->header.version = 1;
block->header.blockNumber = (uint64_t)Chain_Size(chain);
if (Chain_Size(chain) > 0) {
@@ -238,96 +267,17 @@ static void PrintBlockDetail(const block_t* block, size_t txCount, const uint8_t
printf("\n");
}
static bool ComputeEpochSeedForHeightFromChain(const blockchain_t* chain, uint64_t blockHeight, uint8_t outSeed[32]) {
if (!chain || !outSeed) {
return false;
}
const uint64_t epochIndex = blockHeight / EPOCH_LENGTH;
if (epochIndex == 0) {
memset(outSeed, DAG_GENESIS_SEED, 32);
return true;
}
const uint64_t seedBlockNumber = (epochIndex * EPOCH_LENGTH) - 1ULL;
if (seedBlockNumber >= Chain_Size((blockchain_t*)chain)) {
return false;
}
block_t* seedBlock = NULL;
if (!Chain_GetBlockCopy((blockchain_t*)chain, (size_t)seedBlockNumber, &seedBlock)) {
return false;
}
Block_CalculateHash(seedBlock, outSeed);
Block_Destroy(seedBlock);
return true;
}
static bool ComputeEpochDagBytesForHeightFromChain(const blockchain_t* chain, uint64_t blockHeight, size_t* outDagBytes) {
if (!chain || !outDagBytes) {
return false;
}
if (blockHeight <= EPOCH_LENGTH) {
*outDagBytes = DAG_BASE_SIZE;
return true;
}
const uint64_t lastBlockNumber = blockHeight - 1ULL;
const uint64_t epochStartBlockNumber = lastBlockNumber - EPOCH_LENGTH;
if (lastBlockNumber >= Chain_Size((blockchain_t*)chain) || epochStartBlockNumber >= Chain_Size((blockchain_t*)chain)) {
return false;
}
block_t* lastBlock = NULL;
block_t* epochStartBlock = NULL;
if (!Chain_GetBlockCopy((blockchain_t*)chain, (size_t)lastBlockNumber, &lastBlock)) { return false; }
if (!Chain_GetBlockCopy((blockchain_t*)chain, (size_t)epochStartBlockNumber, &epochStartBlock)) { Block_Destroy(lastBlock); return false; }
int64_t difficultyDelta = (int64_t)epochStartBlock->header.difficultyTarget - (int64_t)lastBlock->header.difficultyTarget;
int64_t growth = (int64_t)((int64_t)DAG_BASE_GROWTH * difficultyDelta);
if (growth > 0) {
int64_t maxUp = (int64_t)((DAG_BASE_SIZE * DAG_MAX_UP_SWING_PERCENT_NUM) / DAG_SWING_PERCENT_DEN);
if (growth > maxUp) {
growth = maxUp;
}
if (growth > (int64_t)DAG_MAX_UP_SWING_GB) {
growth = (int64_t)DAG_MAX_UP_SWING_GB;
}
} else {
int64_t maxDown = (int64_t)((DAG_BASE_SIZE * DAG_MAX_DOWN_SWING_PERCENT_NUM) / DAG_SWING_PERCENT_DEN);
if (-growth > maxDown) {
growth = -maxDown;
}
if (-growth > (int64_t)DAG_MAX_DOWN_SWING_GB) {
growth = -(int64_t)DAG_MAX_DOWN_SWING_GB;
}
}
const int64_t targetSize = (int64_t)DAG_BASE_SIZE + growth;
if (targetSize <= 0) {
return false;
}
*outDagBytes = (size_t)targetSize;
Block_Destroy(lastBlock);
Block_Destroy(epochStartBlock);
return true;
}
static bool ComputeHistoricalAutolykosHashFromChain(const blockchain_t* chain, const block_t* block, uint64_t blockHeight, uint8_t outHash[32]) {
if (!chain || !block || !outHash) {
return false;
}
// Same single source of truth the accept path uses, so a block that verifies here verifies
// there. This used to be a second, independent implementation of the epoch size and seed rules
// that disagreed with the one in constants.h -- notably at exactly height EPOCH_LENGTH.
uint8_t seed[32];
size_t dagBytes = 0;
if (!ComputeEpochSeedForHeightFromChain(chain, blockHeight, seed)) {
return false;
}
if (!ComputeEpochDagBytesForHeightFromChain(chain, blockHeight, &dagBytes)) {
if (!Chain_DagParamsForHeight((blockchain_t*)chain, blockHeight, &dagBytes, seed)) {
return false;
}
@@ -445,7 +395,7 @@ static bool MineAndAppendBlock(blockchain_t* chain,
Block_CalculateMerkleRoot(block, merkleRoot);
memcpy(block->header.merkleRoot, merkleRoot, sizeof(block->header.merkleRoot));
if (!MineBlock(block)) {
if (!MineBlock(chain, block)) {
fprintf(stderr, "failed to mine block within nonce range\n");
return false;
}
@@ -477,7 +427,16 @@ static bool MineAndAppendBlock(blockchain_t* chain,
uint8_t canonicalHash[32];
uint8_t powHash[32];
Block_CalculateHash(block, canonicalHash);
Block_CalculateAutolykos2Hash(block, powHash);
memset(powHash, 0, sizeof(powHash));
{
// For the log line only. Resolved fresh rather than carried out of MineBlock because the
// block is on the chain by now, so this also confirms it hashes the same from the tip.
size_t dagBytes = 0;
uint8_t seed[32];
if (Chain_DagParamsForHeight(chain, block->header.blockNumber, &dagBytes, seed)) {
(void)Block_PowHashLight(block, dagBytes, seed, powHash);
}
}
char supplyStr[80];
Uint256ToDecimal(currentSupply, supplyStr, sizeof(supplyStr));
@@ -761,12 +720,23 @@ int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
}
{
// Report the epoch parameters the next block will use. The DAG itself is NOT generated
// here: it is a mining accelerator, so MineBlock builds it on demand and a node that never
// mines never pays for it. This used to build one from a seed derived from the tip block
// rather than the epoch boundary, which meant a node restarted mid-epoch mined against a
// different DAG than one that had run straight through the boundary.
size_t dagBytes = 0;
uint8_t dagSeed[32];
GetNextDAGSeed(chain, dagSeed);
(void)Block_RebuildAutolykos2Dag(CalculateTargetDAGSize(chain), dagSeed);
printf("Built initial DAG with seed %02x%02x%02x%02x... and size %zu bytes\n",
dagSeed[0], dagSeed[1], dagSeed[2], dagSeed[3],
CalculateTargetDAGSize(chain));
const uint64_t nextHeight = (uint64_t)Chain_Size(chain);
if (Chain_DagParamsForHeight(chain, nextHeight, &dagBytes, dagSeed)) {
printf("Epoch %llu DAG: seed %02x%02x%02x%02x... size %zu bytes\n",
(unsigned long long)(nextHeight / (uint64_t)EPOCH_LENGTH),
dagSeed[0], dagSeed[1], dagSeed[2], dagSeed[3],
dagBytes);
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to resolve epoch DAG parameters for height %llu\n",
(unsigned long long)nextHeight);
}
}
if (Chain_Size(chain) > 0) {
@@ -895,6 +865,32 @@ int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
continue;
}
if (strcmp(cmd, "dagvote") == 0) {
char* voteStr = strtok(NULL, " \t");
if (!voteStr) {
printf("dag vote is %u (%s)\n", (unsigned)g_dagVote,
g_dagVote == DAG_VOTE_HOLD ? "hold" : (g_dagVote == DAG_VOTE_DOWN ? "down" : "grow"));
printf("usage: dagvote <grow|hold|down>\n");
continue;
}
if (strcmp(voteStr, "grow") == 0) {
g_dagVote = (uint8_t)DAG_VOTE_GROW;
} else if (strcmp(voteStr, "hold") == 0) {
g_dagVote = (uint8_t)DAG_VOTE_HOLD;
} else if (strcmp(voteStr, "down") == 0) {
g_dagVote = (uint8_t)DAG_VOTE_DOWN;
} else {
printf("usage: dagvote <grow|hold|down>\n");
continue;
}
// Only affects blocks this node mines from here on; it cannot change how already-mined
// blocks are counted, since the vote is committed to inside the hashed header.
printf("dag vote set to %s\n", voteStr);
continue;
}
if (strcmp(cmd, "mine") == 0) {
char* blocksStr = strtok(NULL, " \t");
if (!blocksStr) {
@@ -1547,9 +1543,8 @@ int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
difficultyTarget = INITIAL_DIFFICULTY;
currentReward = CalculateBlockReward(currentSupply, chain);
uint8_t dagSeed[32];
memset(dagSeed, DAG_GENESIS_SEED, sizeof(dagSeed));
(void)Block_RebuildAutolykos2Dag(DAG_BASE_SIZE, dagSeed);
// No DAG rebuild needed: Chain_Wipe drops the memoised epoch table, and MineBlock
// rebuilds the DAG on demand for whatever epoch it next mines in.
printf("chain data wiped\n");
continue;
src/nets/fetch_scheduler.c
+10 -3
View File
@@ -24,9 +24,16 @@ uint64_t FetchScheduler_ComputeReorgPenaltyBlocks(uint64_t delayBlocks) {
}
// Scale by theta and by the block-time ratio, as one fraction so there is a single rounding
// step: penalty = ceil(raised * FACTOR_NUM * TARGET_BLOCK_TIME / (FACTOR_DEN * REF_BLOCK_TIME))
const uint64_t numeratorScale = REORG_PENALTY_FACTOR_NUM * (uint64_t)TARGET_BLOCK_TIME;
const uint64_t denominator = REORG_PENALTY_FACTOR_DEN * REORG_PENALTY_REF_BLOCK_TIME;
// step: penalty = ceil(raised * FACTOR_NUM * REF_BLOCK_TIME / (FACTOR_DEN * TARGET_BLOCK_TIME))
//
// REF_BLOCK_TIME is the NUMERATOR and TARGET_BLOCK_TIME the DENOMINATOR, not the other way
// round. The result is a count of BLOCKS, so the wall-clock protection it buys is
// penalty(d) * TARGET_BLOCK_TIME ~= d^p * REF_BLOCK_TIME -- TARGET_BLOCK_TIME cancels, and the
// protection is the same number of seconds whatever the block time is. Inverting these two
// makes wall-clock protection scale as TARGET_BLOCK_TIME^2, so shortening the block time
// silently weakens reorg protection. Do not "simplify" this back.
const uint64_t numeratorScale = REORG_PENALTY_FACTOR_NUM * REORG_PENALTY_REF_BLOCK_TIME;
const uint64_t denominator = REORG_PENALTY_FACTOR_DEN * (uint64_t)TARGET_BLOCK_TIME;
if (denominator == 0ULL) {
return 0ULL;
}
src/nets/net_node.c
+7 -5
View File
@@ -463,16 +463,18 @@ static node_block_accept_result_t Node_ParseAndAcceptBlock(const unsigned char*
}
}
// Validate block
if (!Block_IsFullyValid(blk)) {
printf("Rejected BLOCK_DATA at height %" PRIu64 " during validation\n", blockHeight);
// The chain check has to come first now: PoW validity is chain-relative (the epoch DAG size and
// seed are derived from it), so there is nothing to validate against without a chain.
if (!currentChain) {
printf("Rejected BLOCK_DATA at height %" PRIu64 ": no active chain\n", blockHeight);
DynArr_destroy(blk->transactions);
free(blk);
return NODE_BLOCK_REJECTED;
}
if (!currentChain) {
printf("Rejected BLOCK_DATA at height %" PRIu64 ": no active chain\n", blockHeight);
// Validate block
if (!Block_IsFullyValid(blk, currentChain)) {
printf("Rejected BLOCK_DATA at height %" PRIu64 " during validation\n", blockHeight);
DynArr_destroy(blk->transactions);
free(blk);
return NODE_BLOCK_REJECTED;