Two consensus-parameter bugs, both latent today and both guaranteed to become
live splits later. Neither is a regression; both are cheap to fix now and
expensive to fix after launch.
== 1. The reorg penalty scaled with block time the wrong way ==
FetchScheduler_ComputeReorgPenaltyBlocks had TARGET_BLOCK_TIME in the numerator
and REORG_PENALTY_REF_BLOCK_TIME in the denominator. The penalty is counted in
BLOCKS, so the wall-clock protection it actually buys was
penalty(d) * TARGET_BLOCK_TIME ~ d^2 * T^2 / REF
i.e. quadratic in block time, when the stated intent in constants.h is
wall-clock equivalence to the reference scheme defined at REF_BLOCK_TIME = 150.
At T = 90 the chain got 54*d^2 seconds of protection instead of 150*d^2 --
2.78x weaker than intended -- and any future block-time reduction would have
weakened it further, silently.
Swapping the two makes T cancel out of the wall-clock figure:
penalty(d) = ceil(d^2 * REF / T) -> protection ~ d^2 * REF seconds
Penalty in blocks, depth -> before/after: 4 -> 10/27, 8 -> 39/107,
10 -> 60/167, 50 -> 1500/4167, 100 -> 6000/16667.
Verified by rebuilding at TARGET_BLOCK_TIME = 60: wall-clock protection is now
identical at both block times (2400s, 9600s, 15000s, ...), ratio 1.0000. Under
the old formula 60s blocks would have been 56% weaker.
Still integer-only: the ceiling division and saturation guards are unchanged,
and numeratorScale only moves 90 -> 150 while `raised` stays bounded by
REORG_PENALTY_MAX_DEPTH^2 = 1e6, nowhere near overflow.
This is fork choice, not block validity, so mixed-version nodes converge once
the longer penalty expires and no block ever becomes invalid.
== 2. DAG sizing was a fail-open consensus split waiting on block 350000 ==
Fixed, in rough order of severity:
* FAIL-OPEN PoW. Block_CalculateAutolykos2Hash memset the hash to zero on any
failure, and zero compares below every target -- so a DAG that was missing,
mis-sized or had failed to build made *every* block pass PoW validation
instead of rejecting it. PoW checks now fail closed.
* TWO DIVERGENT IMPLEMENTATIONS of the same rule: CalculateTargetDAGSize in
constants.h (mining) and ComputeEpochDagBytesForHeightFromChain in main.c
(verification). They already disagreed at exactly height == EPOCH_LENGTH,
where the constants.h copy underflowed size_t computing
`Chain_Size - 1 - EPOCH_LENGTH` and returned 0.
* A MEANINGLESS DIFFICULTY COUPLING. difficultyTarget is compact-encoded
[1B exponent][3B coefficient]; subtracting two compact values mixes
exponent and mantissa. The first real retarget yields a delta of 900649,
which times DAG_BASE_GROWTH is ~967 TB, so the result was always clamped
and the "proportional" term degenerated to a binary base+maxUp/base-maxDown
switch. The size also never accumulated -- it was always recomputed from
the constant base -- so the documented 1 GB/epoch growth could not happen.
* A NON-EPOCH-ALIGNED SEED. GetNextDAGSeed returned hash(tip) while the
verifier correctly used hash(block[epochIndex * EPOCH_LENGTH - 1]). The
`chainSize % EPOCH_LENGTH == 0` rebuild guard masked this while running,
but startup called it at an arbitrary height -- so a node restarted
mid-epoch built a DAG from a different seed than one that had run straight
through the boundary, and its blocks were rejected.
* UNSIGNED PROMOTION. `DAG_BASE_GROWTH * difficultyDelta` promoted the signed
delta to unsigned long long and wrapped before being assigned back to
int64_t; the main.c copy cast first, so the two also differed in overflow
behaviour. Both are gone.
* A LEAK on the `targetSize <= 0` path in main.c (both block copies).
* A USE-AFTER-FREE at every epoch boundary: Block_RebuildAutolykos2Dag ran
DagClear -> DagAllocate -> DagGenerate from whichever thread advanced the
tip, freeing ctx->dag.buf while miners read it.
* GetAutolykos2Ctx called DagAllocate without DagGenerate, leaving
dag.len == 0 so every heavy hash failed -- which, combined with the
fail-open above, meant "everything is valid". It also memset 1 GiB that
DagGenerate immediately overwrote.
* TOCTOU / lock reentrancy: CalculateTargetDAGSize called Chain_Size 4x and
Chain_GetBlockCopy 2x, each taking chainLock for reading, making it unsafe
to call from a write-locked section.
--- New sizing rule: default-grow inside a hard band ---
DAG size now follows a recurrence gated by a miner signal in the block header,
clamped to [DAG_MIN_SIZE, DAG_MAX_SIZE]:
brake = (hold + down) * DAG_BRAKE_DEN > EPOCH_LENGTH * DAG_BRAKE_NUM
downQ = down * DAG_DOWN_DEN > EPOCH_LENGTH * DAG_DOWN_NUM
downQ(k) && downQ(k-1) -> size -= DAG_EPOCH_STEP (floored at DAG_MIN_SIZE)
brake -> size unchanged
otherwise -> size += DAG_EPOCH_STEP (capped at DAG_MAX_SIZE)
Growth is the default and there is deliberately NO up-vote: every signal a
miner can express only slows the walk or reverses it. Under stratum-style
pooled mining the pool builds the header and therefore controls its share of
the vote, so the mechanism has to be safe under pool capture -- and it is,
because the lever a pool would want (grow the DAG to price out smaller miners)
does not exist. This is NOT because upward capture would be self-defeating: it
would in fact be profitable, since the fixed block reward redistributes to
whoever survives and difficulty retargets down. The protection is the absence
of the lever. The whole upward trajectory is therefore governance
(DAG_EPOCH_STEP, DAG_MAX_SIZE), not signalling.
Braking keeps the DAG small, which helps old hardware and only costs ASIC
resistance -- bounded by DAG_MIN_SIZE, which is the constant that actually
secures the property. Shrinking needs a supermajority sustained across two
consecutive epochs; that gates the onset only, so miners genuinely being
squeezed get relief every epoch rather than every other one.
Thresholds are cross-multiplied rather than divided, so there is no rounding
for nodes to disagree on, and the denominator is the constant epoch length
rather than blocks-observed, so a partial epoch cannot read as a stronger
signal than it is. No floating point anywhere on this path.
--- Header vote field ---
reserved[0] carries the vote: 0 = grow (default), 1 = hold, 2 = down.
reserved[1..2] must be zero. All three already sat inside the packed, hashed
header, so the vote is committed to by both the canonical hash and the PoW hash
and cannot be altered after mining -- no wire-format or hash-layout change.
0 must mean grow, because the point of this shape is that inaction produces
growth; it also means a miner that knows nothing about the vote contributes to
the intended default rather than silently freezing the schedule.
Rejecting unrecognised vote values and non-zero spare bytes is a new validity
rule. It closes 24 bits of undefined-meaning malleable header space.
--- Validation moves to the light path ---
Autolykos2_DagGenerate fills lane i with exactly what ReadDagLaneFromSeed
recomputes for lane i -- Blake2b(seed || (i/2)_LE64), half i&1 -- so the DAG is
a pure cache and the two hashing paths are bit-for-bit equivalent. Validation
therefore uses the light path: no allocation, correct for any epoch rather than
only whichever one the global DAG happens to hold, and the DAG band becomes a
miner requirement rather than a full-node memory requirement.
Chain_OnTipAdvanced no longer rebuilds the DAG at all. MineBlock builds it on
demand for the height it is working on, so a node that does not mine never
allocates one, generation stays off the tip-advance path, and the buffer is
only ever touched by the miner (the ctx mutex remains as a backstop).
--- API changes ---
+ Chain_DagParamsForHeight(chain, height, &dagBytes, seed) -- single source
of truth for both the size and the epoch seed, backed by a memoised
per-epoch table on blockchain_t. The table is a pure cache of a function of
the headers, extended lazily and dropped whenever anything at or below the
tip changes; it lives on the chain rather than in a global because a
second, header-only chain is built to re-verify historical PoW. Guarded by
a per-chain mutex, always taken after chainLock.
+ Block_EnsureAutolykos2Dag / Block_PowHashHeavy / Block_PowHashLight.
The heavy variant verifies the epoch and size itself, so it can never
answer from a DAG built for another epoch.
+ Block_HasValidProofOfWorkWithParams -- resolve-once form. MineBlock called
Block_HasValidProofOfWork inside its nonce loop, so resolving from the
chain per attempt would have taken chainLock millions of times per block.
+ Block_HasValidVote.
~ Block_HasValidProofOfWork / Block_IsFullyValid now take the chain, because
PoW validity genuinely is chain-relative. blockchain_t gained a struct tag
so block.h can forward-declare it.
- CalculateTargetDAGSize, GetNextDAGSeed, ComputeEpochDagBytesForHeightFromChain,
ComputeEpochSeedForHeightFromChain, Block_CalculateAutolykos2Hash,
Block_RebuildAutolykos2Dag, Autolykos2_LightHash (dead).
- DAG_BASE_GROWTH and the five DAG_MAX_*_SWING_* / DAG_SWING_PERCENT_DEN
macros, all now unreachable.
Also: Block_CalculateAutolykos2Hash truncated the height to uint32 while the
light path takes uint64, so the two would have diverged above block 2^32; the
full width is now passed. Added a `dagvote <grow|hold|down>` REPL command and a
progress line during DAG generation, which is tens of seconds at production
sizes.
static_asserts now enforce DAG_MIN_SIZE <= DAG_BASE_SIZE <= DAG_MAX_SIZE and
32-byte alignment, so a misconfigured band fails the build instead of being
silently clamped.
NOTE: DAG_MIN_SIZE (2 GiB), DAG_BASE_SIZE (2 GiB), DAG_MAX_SIZE (8 GiB) and
DAG_EPOCH_STEP (1 GiB) are economic judgements, not derivations, and since the
vote cannot accelerate growth they are the entire upward story. Sanity-check
them before launch.
== Verification ==
* Penalty: exact table match at d = 4/8/10/50/100/1000, zero within grace,
saturation at MAX_DEPTH, and identical wall-clock protection when rebuilt
at TARGET_BLOCK_TIME = 60.
* DAG recurrence (30 assertions against the real objects): default growth,
legacy all-zero headers read as grow, strict inequality at exactly 1/2 and
exactly 7/8, one qualifying epoch freezes but does not shrink, two
consecutive shrink, sustained shrink repeats, both clamps saturate.
* Epoch seed: constant across an epoch, equal to hash(block[k*EL - 1]),
genesis seed in epoch 0, and resolvable at exactly height == EPOCH_LENGTH.
* Fail-closed: unresolvable params and a zero-byte DAG both reject.
* Heavy/light equivalence across 3 epochs; heavy refuses a DAG built for the
wrong epoch or size.
* Two nodes across 3 epoch boundaries: B reached height 30 purely by
receiving, then mined blocks A accepted; both fullverify Chain OK, zero
rejections.
* Restart mid-epoch: B restarted at height 28 derived epoch 3's seed as
hash(block[23]) -- the boundary block, not the tip -- and kept producing
blocks A accepted. This fails before the change.
* Divergent votes: A voting hold and B voting grow computed identical size
and seed, confirming the tally is chain-derived, not config-derived.
* ThreadSanitizer across epoch rollovers under load: no new races.
142 lines
6.8 KiB
C
142 lines
6.8 KiB
C
#ifndef CHAIN_H
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#define CHAIN_H
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#include <block/block.h>
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#include <dynarr.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdbool.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <pthread.h>
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#include <uint256.h>
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#include <storage/block_table.h>
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#include <balance_sheet.h>
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// One entry of the memoised DAG size recurrence, one per epoch. See Chain_DagParamsForHeight.
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typedef struct {
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uint64_t sizeBytes; // DAG size used by every block whose height falls in this epoch
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bool downQualified; // this epoch's own votes met the down supermajority
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} dag_epoch_state_t;
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// Tagged so block.h can forward-declare it: PoW validity depends on the chain (it needs the epoch
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// seed), but chain.h includes block.h, so the tag is what breaks the cycle.
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typedef struct blockchain {
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DynArr* blocks;
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size_t size;
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/**
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* Memoised DAG size recurrence: a pure cache of a function of the block headers, extended
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* lazily and dropped whenever anything at or below the tip changes (every epoch's size depends
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* on the votes of every epoch before it). It lives on the chain rather than in a global because
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* a second, header-only blockchain_t is built to re-verify historical PoW, and the two must not
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* share a cache.
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*
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* `dagEpochsComputed` counts valid `sizeBytes` entries. `downQualified` is only filled in for
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* an epoch once the *following* entry has been computed, so it is valid on
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* [0, dagEpochsComputed - 1).
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*
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* Guarded by `dagCacheLock`, which is always taken AFTER `chainLock` and is never held across a
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* call back into chain.c.
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**/
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dag_epoch_state_t* dagEpochs;
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size_t dagEpochsComputed;
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size_t dagEpochsCapacity;
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pthread_mutex_t dagCacheLock;
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} blockchain_t;
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blockchain_t* Chain_Create();
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void Chain_Destroy(blockchain_t* chain);
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bool Chain_AddBlock(blockchain_t* chain, block_t* block);
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block_t* Chain_GetBlock(blockchain_t* chain, size_t index);
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size_t Chain_Size(blockchain_t* chain);
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bool Chain_IsValid(blockchain_t* chain);
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void Chain_Wipe(blockchain_t* chain);
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// Roll back the chain to `height` (exclusive): after this call, Chain_Size(chain) == height
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// Returns true on success.
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bool Chain_RollbackToHeight(blockchain_t* chain, size_t height);
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/**
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* Atomically replace the blocks at [forkHeight, tip] with `newBlocks` (ascending, `count` of them).
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*
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* The swap happens only if the candidate branch is properly linked, has strictly more cumulative
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* work, and has served its Horizen delayed-submission penalty. `observedAtTipHeight` is the local
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* tip height at which the branch was FIRST seen and must not be recomputed as the chain grows --
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* see the comment in the implementation. The initial-block-download exemption is decided inside,
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* from local state only, so no caller can switch the penalty off.
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*
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* On any failure the original chain, balance sheet, supply and reward are restored and false is
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* returned. The caller keeps ownership of `newBlocks` in every case: the chain applies copies.
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**/
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bool Chain_ReplaceBranch(blockchain_t* chain,
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size_t forkHeight,
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block_t** newBlocks,
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size_t count,
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uint64_t observedAtTipHeight);
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// True when this node is catching up rather than following the tip (empty chain, or a median
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// block time far in the past). Used to exempt initial sync from the reorg penalty.
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bool Chain_IsInitialBlockDownload(blockchain_t* chain);
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// Penalty in blocks of local chain growth before a branch forking `reorgDepth` blocks back may be
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// adopted. Thin wrapper over FetchScheduler_ComputeReorgPenaltyBlocks, for callers that only
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// want to report it.
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uint64_t Chain_ReorgPenaltyForDepth(uint64_t reorgDepth);
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// Recompute `currentSupply` and `currentReward` from the in-memory chain blocks.
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// Returns true on success and updates runtime state globals.
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bool Chain_RecomputeRuntimeState(blockchain_t* chain);
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// Retrieve a deep copy of the block at `index`. Caller must free with `Block_Destroy`.
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bool Chain_GetBlockCopy(blockchain_t* chain, size_t index, block_t** outCopy);
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// I/O
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bool Chain_SaveToFile(blockchain_t* chain, const char* dirpath, uint256_t currentSupply, uint64_t currentReward);
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bool Chain_LoadFromFile(blockchain_t* chain, const char* dirpath, uint256_t* outCurrentSupply, uint32_t* outDifficultyTarget, uint64_t* outCurrentReward, uint8_t* outLastSavedHash, bool loadTransactions);
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bool Chain_LoadBlockFromFile(const char* dirpath, uint64_t blockNumber, bool loadTransactions, block_t** outBlock, size_t* outTxCount);
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// Difficulty
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// Retarget for the block at `height`, measured over the window [height - INTERVAL, height - 1].
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// `chain` must hold blocks 0..height-1. Takes no locks; safe to call while holding `chainLock`.
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uint32_t Chain_ComputeTargetAtHeight(blockchain_t* chain, uint64_t height, uint32_t currentTarget);
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// The consensus-required difficultyTarget for the block at `height`, derived from the chain alone.
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// Takes no locks; safe to call while holding `chainLock`.
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uint32_t Chain_GetTargetForHeight(blockchain_t* chain, uint64_t height);
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// Refresh runtime state derived from the chain tip (difficulty target, epoch DAG).
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// Call after any change to the tip. Must NOT be called while holding `chainLock`.
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void Chain_OnTipAdvanced(blockchain_t* chain);
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// DAG
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/**
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* The Autolykos2 DAG size and epoch seed that the block at `blockHeight` must be hashed against.
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*
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* This is the single source of truth for both, so the mining path and the verification path cannot
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* drift apart. Size follows the default-grow recurrence gated by the miner votes in
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* `header.reserved[0]` (see the DAG band in constants.h); the seed is epoch-aligned -- epoch 0 uses
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* the genesis seed, epoch k uses the hash of the last block of epoch k-1 -- so it is constant for
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* the whole epoch rather than changing every block.
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*
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* Requires the chain to hold every block below the start of `blockHeight`'s epoch, which is always
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* true when validating or mining a block at that height. Returns false if it cannot produce both
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* values; callers MUST treat that as an invalid proof rather than falling back to a default.
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*
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* Takes `chainLock` for reading internally. Must NOT be called while holding it.
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**/
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bool Chain_DagParamsForHeight(blockchain_t* chain, uint64_t blockHeight,
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size_t* outDagBytes, uint8_t outSeed[32]);
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// Work
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// Expected number of hashes to satisfy `difficultyTargetBits`, i.e. 2^256 / (target + 1).
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bool Chain_ComputeBlockWork(uint32_t difficultyTargetBits, uint256_t* outWork);
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// Summed work of the chain's blocks over the half-open range [from, to).
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// Takes no locks; safe to call while holding `chainLock`.
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bool Chain_ComputeWorkRange(blockchain_t* chain, size_t from, size_t to, uint256_t* outWork);
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// Summed work of a candidate branch that is not (yet) part of the chain.
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bool Chain_ComputeBranchWork(block_t** blocks, size_t count, uint256_t* outWork);
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#endif
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